top of page

Identity Threat Concepts - Cookie Stealing

  • brencronin
  • 6 days ago
  • 13 min read

Updated: 4 days ago


Understanding Identity in Transit vs. Identity at Rest: The Session Hijack Problem


This article breaks down a key issue in modern identity protection: the critical difference between “Identity at Rest” and “Identity in Transit.”


[image for knox maybe]


1. Identity at Rest


Identity at rest refers to credentials stored on systems or in databases, password hashes, key material, etc. Traditional attacks here include:


  • Breaches targeting hashed credentials.


Well-defined defenses exist for this space:


  • Strong password hashing with salting (e.g., bcrypt, scrypt).

  • Limiting access and alerting on suspicious retrieval.


These problems, while still relevant, are relatively well understood and defendable with best practices.


2. Identity in Transit: Where the Game Changes


When users authenticate to web applications, stateless protocols like HTTP/S are typically used. To maintain the session without repeated logins, servers issue session tokens or cookies post-authentication.


The core security challenge is that these cookies function as bearer tokens, whoever holds them is granted access, without re-verification. On desktop operating systems, there's limited browser application isolation from the user's context, meaning any local malware running in the user's context can access the same browser memory and file space. Since the browser must access session cookies to function, so can the malware, making cookie/token theft a powerful method for identity compromise.


This is where a new class of risks emerge: if the session cookie/token can be stolen, the attacker can impersonate the user, without needing the password. Worse, these cookies/tokens often bypass MFA protections since they're issued after the MFA step.


The Identity in Transit Threat Landscape


There are two primary categories for how session cookies/tokens are compromised:


A. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Based Theft


These techniques intercept authentication sessions before or after login, capturing session tokens:


  • AiTM – Adversary-in-the-Middle: Attacker proxies user traffic to the real login page and steals the token post-authentication.

    • Tools: Evilginx2, Modlishka

  • BiTM – Browser-in-the-Middle: User operates in a tampered or malicious browser environment that intercepts authentication traffic.


[image]


These are especially dangerous because they don’t require system-level compromise, just user interaction with a malicious site or proxy. Common outcomes include:


  • Business Email Compromise (BEC)

  • Initial access to corporate SaaS environments to further escalate compromises.


B. Endpoint-Based Cookie Theft (InfoStealers)


These involve direct compromise of the user’s system and extraction of session cookies/tokens stored in browsers:


[image]


Notable InfoStealers:

  • RedLine Stealer: Steals credentials, session cookies, and crypto wallets. Delivered via phishing or malicious ads.

  • Vidar Stealer: Grabs browser data and OS credentials, often spread via drive-by downloads.

  • Raccoon Stealer: Specializes in autofill data, passwords, and cookies.

  • Lumma Stealer: A newer MaaS stealer, actively updated and sold in cybercrime forums.


Common InfoStealer Techniques:

  • Remote browser debugging abuse

  • Browser process memory dumping

  • Direct cookie file extraction (e.g., from Chrome/Edge paths)

  • Malicious browser extensions with elevated access


While these require local compromise, they remain widespread due to stealer malware campaigns targeting everyday users and unmanaged systems.


Identity Attack Chain: InfoStealer Session Hijacking


Breaking down the identity attack chain specific to session cookie theft via InfoStealers:


1. Initial Access


The threat actor compromises the user’s endpoint, most commonly through:


  • Phishing emails

  • Malvertising

  • Trojanized software downloads


These initial infection vectors often deliver InfoStealer malware directly or via additional loaders.


2. Session Theft


Once on the system, the InfoStealer exfiltrates session data, such as:


  • Web browser session cookies

  • Stored credentials

  • System tokens or credentials (using tools like Mimikatz, though these are increasingly detected by EDRs)


Browser session theft is often stealthier and easier than browser memory access, making it the preferred technique when evading modern EDRs.


To enable session theft, attackers may:


  • Exploit remote debugging protocols (e.g., Chrome DevTools)

  • Dump browser memory or session storage

  • Install malicious browser extensions


Session Replay


The stolen session cookie or token is then injected into a new browser session controlled by the attacker.


  • No password or MFA prompt is then required

  • The attacker assumes the authenticated identity of the victim

  • The session grants full access based on the victim’s roles and permissions in the web-based consoles they access


Post-Exploitation & Persistence


If the compromised session belongs to a privileged user (e.g., administrator), via administrative web consoles the attacker can:


  • Modify configurations via web portals

  • Create new accounts

  • Create persistent backdoors

  • Move laterally across SaaS platforms

  • Escalate privileges or access sensitive data


This is why session cookies from active enterprise cloud platforms, such as Azure, Google Workspace, or AWS, are highly valuable targets for attackers during post-exploitation, as they enable seamless access without reauthentication.



Techniques for Browser Session Theft


Commonly used Threat Actor techniques to steal session cookies directly from web browsers:


  1. Remote Browser Debugging Abuse

  2. Browser Process Memory Dumping

  3. Direct Cookie File Extraction (e.g., Chrome/Edge user data paths)

  4. Malicious Browser Extensions with elevated privileges


1. Remote Browser Debugging Abuse


Attackers increasingly exploit remote debugging features to bypass newer browser security controls like Chrome’s App-Bound Encryption (ABE). By launching browsers like Chrome or Edge with the --remote-debugging-port flag, malware can expose the browser's internal APIs, granting direct access to session data such as cookies and tokens.


This method circumvents App-Bound Encryption (ABE), a security feature designed to protect sensitive data (like cookies) by binding decryption to the legitimate Chrome process. ABE relies on a privileged service to validate that only the authenticated Chrome application can access, and decrypt stored credentials. However, when debugging is enabled, this boundary is weakened, allowing info-stealers to retrieve decrypted session data without triggering typical OS-level access controls.


Example (Microsoft Edge):

msedge.exe --remote-debugging-port=9334

(Note: Many of the infostealer families were observed using port 9222)


To avoid alerting the user, the browser is often launched in headless mode:

--headless

To load the victim’s profile data (cookies, history, bookmarks), attackers use:

--user-data-dir=C:\Path\To\User\Data

Once running, the malware connects to the exposed debugging port, uses the browser’s API to enumerate cookies, and exfiltrates session data.


Detection Strategies


Monitor browser launch commands for suspicious flags such as:


  • --remote-debugging-port=

  • --remote-debugging-targets=

  • --user-data-dir=

  • Absence of --remote-debugging-port=0 (which disables debugging)


Atomic Red Team Example (Testing):

Get-Process msedge | Stop-Process Start-Process "msedge.exe" "https://outlook.com --remote-debugging-port=9334 --remote-allow-origins=*"

Tunneling Access to Remote Debugging Ports


A common technique used by threat actors in session theft attacks is traffic tunneling. Since browser debugging ports are typically accessible only on the local machine, attackers often expose them remotely using port forwarding.


To achieve this, they may use the netsh interface portproxy command to forward traffic from an external port to the local debugging port:

netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenaddress=0.0.0.0 listenport=9443 connectaddress=127.0.0.1 connectport=9334

Additionally, they may modify firewall rules to allow inbound connections to the remote listening port.


Additional Detection Opportunities related to remote port access


Monitoring for use of netsh interface portproxy or unusual firewall modifications on Windows endpoints may indicate attempts to expose local debugging ports, often a strong signal of infostealer or session hijacking activity.


Browser Process Memory Dumping: A Post-Decryption Cookie Theft Technique


Malware can perform process injection or memory scraping on running browser processes such as chrome.exe or msedge.exe to extract sensitive session data directly from memory. This technique targets the decrypted state of session cookies while they are actively loaded and in use by the browser.


Unlike file-based cookie theft (which requires decryption of encrypted cookie stores like Chrome’s Cookies SQLite DB), process memory dumping bypasses encryption altogether, since browsers must decrypt session cookies into memory for runtime use. Steps for browser process memory dumping.


  1. Code Injection or Handle Access: The malware opens a handle to the browser process using Windows APIs like OpenProcess, and may inject malicious code using WriteProcessMemory or similar techniques.

  2. Memory Read and Extraction: Using memory reading APIs (e.g., ReadProcessMemory), the malware scans the browser’s memory regions for identifiable cookie structures or session tokens.

  3. Cookie Reconstruction: Extracted values (like Set-Cookie strings or JWT access tokens) are parsed and reused for authenticated session hijacking, no password or MFA needed.


Direct Cookie File Extraction (e.g., Chrome/Edge user data paths)


Direct Cookie File Extraction (e.g., Chrome/Edge User Data Paths)

Browsers like Chrome and Edge store session cookies in encrypted SQLite databases to preserve login sessions and protect user credentials. For Chrome, cookies are located at:

%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Network\Cookies

These cookies are encrypted using DPAPI (Data Protection API), which ties decryption keys to the user’s Windows login context. While DPAPI provides effective protection against external access, malware running within the user’s session, such as infostealers, can leverage native Windows APIs (e.g., CryptUnprotectData) to locally decrypt cookie values.


Two Common Techniques Used by Threat Actors:


  1. Local Decryption:

    • Infostealers directly decrypt the AES key using DPAPI within the infected session.

  2. Remote Decryption:

    • Attackers extract the user's DPAPI master key from:

C:\Users\<User>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect
  • If the attacker can obtain the user's login credentials or DPAPI_SYSTEM secret, they can attempt offline decryption on another system.


Application-Bound Encryption (ABE)


In Chrome 127 (July 2024), Application-Bound Encryption (ABE) was introduced to mitigate these attacks. ABE ensures that even if malware runs under the user context, access to cookies is denied unless the decryption request originates from the legitimate Chrome process. This is enforced by a privileged Chrome service running as SYSTEM, which validates the request source before returning the decryption key.


To bypass ABE, infostealers have shifted tactics:


  • Remote Debugging Abuse: Launch Chrome with --remote-debugging-port to access session cookies via exposed APIs.

  • Downgrade Attacks: Some malware modifies registry keys to disable ABE protections. For example, in Microsoft Edge:

Registry Path: HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Edge 
Key: ApplicationBoundEncryption
Value: 0 (disables ABE)

Once ABE is disabled and the browser is restarted, session cookies become accessible using legacy decryption techniques.


Malicious Browser Extension Attacks


Malicious browser extensions are a stealthy threat vector that operate inside the browser’s security context, giving adversaries direct access to authentication cookies, session tokens, and other sensitive web data, without needing system-level exploits.


Disguised as legitimate tools (e.g., productivity add-ons or shopping assistants), these extensions often request excessive permissions, such as:


  • Access to all websites (<all_urls>)

  • Read/modify web page content

  • Use of browser storage APIs

  • Intercepting network traffic (webRequest, webRequestBlocking)


Once installed, a malicious extension can:


  • Read and exfiltrate session cookies in real time

  • Inject JavaScript to hijack active sessions

  • Capture sensitive form data and credentials

  • Bypass MFA through session token replay attacks


Because they do not involve process injection or disk decryption, these attacks are highly evasive, often bypassing traditional EDR and antivirus solutions.


Developer Mode: A Hidden Risk in Browser Extension Attacks


An often-overlooked risk in browser extension attacks is Developer Mode. When enabled, it allows unsigned or custom extensions to be manually loaded, bypassing standard extension signing and review processes.


Attackers can exploit this by configuring the browser to run in Developer Mode and loading malicious extensions as part of their attack chain. This tactic enables stealthy deployment of unauthorized extensions without triggering traditional extension security checks.


Why malicious extension attacks are dangerous


  • They persist through browser restarts and user sessions

  • Run with the same trust level as the browser

  • Easily evade endpoint-based detections

  • Can also exfiltrate data over encrypted HTTPS connections


Chrome Extension File Paths


For forensic investigation or incident response, Chrome browser extensions are stored in:


  • Windows

    • C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Extensions

  • Linux

    • ~/.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions/

  • macOS

    • ~/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/Default/Extensions/


Protecting Against Malicious Browser Extension Attacks


1. Enforce Extension Allowlisting: Use enterprise device control policies, such as Chrome ADMX templates or Microsoft Edge GPO settings, to allow only approved browser extensions. This helps block unverified or risky add-ons before they're installed.


2. Monitor and Audit Extensions: Limit the number of installed extensions and perform regular audits to identify unnecessary or potentially dangerous ones. Prioritize minimalism and remove anything not essential to business functions.


3. Validate Developer Reputation and Permissions: Ensure extensions are published by trusted developers. Review their requested permissions carefully, watch for red flags like access to “all URLs,” tabs, cookies, or storage APIs.


4. Use Defensive Tools: Deploy tools like Chrome Extension Defender or ExtShield to detect malicious behavior, such as unexpected data access or suspicious network activity originating from extensions.


5. Maintain Up-to-Date Browsers and Extensions: Regularly update browsers and extensions to patch known vulnerabilities. Enable automatic updates where possible to reduce risk from outdated software.


Conclusion: Combatting Infostealers in the Identity Attack Chain


This identity-centric attack chain underscores a critical shift: defending identity in transit is just as essential as protecting credentials at rest. Techniques like MFA and strong passwords become irrelevant once a session cookies/tokens are hijacked. Modern attacks increasingly target web-based authentication, leveraging stolen session cookies/tokens to bypass even robust access controls.


To counter this, maintaining secure browser configurations is non-negotiable. Keeping browsers patched is a baseline control, as demonstrated by the improvements in Chrome 127, which introduced Application-Bound Encryption (ABE) to limit unauthorized cookie access. Likewise, preventing high-risk behaviors such as enabling Developer Mode, loading unsanctioned extensions, or launching browsers with remote debugging enabled must be enforced through policy and configuration management.


Emerging technologies are also shifting the defense paradigm:


  • Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC), introduced as a trial in Chrome 135, bind session credentials to device hardware using cryptographic keys, limiting the ability to replay stolen tokens.

  • Secure hardened enterprise browsers like island.io go further, enforcing strict memory, process, and file access controls to protect browser resources from exfiltration, even under compromise.


Layered detection strategies are necessary


Even with strong controls, real-world environments are imperfect. Browsers will be misconfigured, and users will be tricked. This makes detection and monitoring for infostealer activity essential. While infostealers vary widely, they share common capabilities, including:


  • Extracting browser-stored data such as passwords, cookies, autofill entries, and download histories.

  • Capturing system and user context (e.g., usernames, geolocation, hardware details, and presence of security tools).

  • Exfiltrating this data to command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.

  • Serving as loaders for secondary payloads or malware deployment.


Some of these behaviors (e.g., exfiltration to C2) are consistent with broader malware tactics, but others, especially the direct targeting of browser data, require specialized detection strategies. That’s why visibility into browser telemetry, session activity, and anomalous API usage is now a critical part of identity threat detection.


As attackers increasingly pivot from stealing passwords to hijacking active sessions, defenders must evolve in kind. Securing web access is no longer just about authentication, it’s about controlling and monitoring the full browser environment.


This means enforcing the use of hardened enterprise browsers, implementing protections like token binding, and tightly restricting risky features such as remote debugging and developer mode.


Equally important is behavioral monitoring of browser activity to detect session hijacking techniques in real time. These measures aren’t optional, they form the foundation of a modern, defense-in-depth identity security strategy.


KQL Detection References


Identify browser processes started with both --remote-debugging-port and --headless, which is a strong indicator of covert browser-based data theft.


DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "opera.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "--remote-debugging-port"
       and ProcessCommandLine has "--headless"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("--remote-debugging-port", "--headless", "--user-data-dir")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName

Flags the use of netsh to configure a port proxy, commonly used to expose local-only services like browser debugging interfaces.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "netsh.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_all ("interface", "portproxy", "add")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName

KQL Detection Query: Suspicious Access to Browser Process Memory


DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessAccessed"
| where TargetProcessName in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe", "brave.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe", "brave.exe") // exclude self-access
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("csrss.exe", "explorer.exe", "taskmgr.exe", "svchost.exe") // filter common legit processes
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, 
         TargetProcess = TargetProcessName,
         SourceProcess = InitiatingProcessFileName,
         SourcePath = InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
         TargetPath = TargetProcessFolderPath
| summarize Count = count() by SourceProcess, SourcePath, TargetProcess, TargetPath, bin(timestamp, 1h)
| where Count > 2
| sort by Count desc
  • DeviceProcessEvents logs process interactions like access handles (via OpenProcess API).

  • ActionType == "ProcessAccessed" filters for memory or handle access events.

  • The query focuses on access to browser processes, excluding common benign sources like taskmgr.exe.

  • This version filters by known browsers, and raises alerts for non-browser processes accessing them multiple times within an hour.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !~ "chrome.exe"
    and InitiatingProcessFileName !~ "msedge.exe"
    and InitiatingProcessFileName !~ "firefox.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe")
| where ActionType in~ ("ProcessInjection", "OpenProcess", "ReadProcessMemory", "VirtualAllocEx", "WriteProcessMemory")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ActionType, ReportId, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessId

DeviceEvents
| where ActionType == "HandleOpened"
| where AdditionalFields contains "ReadProcessMemory"
| where TargetImage in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, TargetImage, ReportId
  • Pay attention to access from unsigned binaries or unknown paths (%AppData%, %Temp%, etc.).

  • High count of access events in a short window is a key indicator of memory scraping attempts.

  • Consider correlating with Sysmon Event ID 10 or Defender DeviceNetworkEvents if C2 communication follows.


  • Add process signer status using InitiatingProcessSigner from DeviceProcessEvents.

  • Add InitiatingProcessCommandLine for visibility into suspicious execution patterns.

  • Use DeviceNetworkEvents join to see if the originating process also communicates externally.

  • Tie into Defender XDR hunting to track subsequent use of session tokens (e.g., via unusual browser logins).


KQL Detection – Registry Downgrade of ABE

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey has @"Software\Policies\Microsoft\Edge\ApplicationBoundEncryption"
| where RegistryValueName == "Enabled"
| where RegistryValueData == "0"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, ReportId

KQL Detection – ABE Bypass via SYSTEM + Chrome COM DecryptData Abuse


DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName =~ "SYSTEM"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "chrome_elevation_service.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "DecryptData"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
  • chrome_elevation_service.exe: This binary is responsible for privileged Chrome operations, including access to encrypted data.

  • DecryptData: A common method exposed through the COM interface used to request decryption from the Elevation Service.

  • SYSTEM context: This detection is scoped to cases where the process is spawned under elevated privileges, a red flag for cookie exfiltration via malware or privilege abuse.


KQL Detection – Suspicious Chrome Extension Behavior

DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath has "Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Extensions"
| where FileName endswith ".js" or FileName endswith ".json"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe")  // Unusual process modifying extensions
| extend ExtensionId = extract(@"Extensions\\([^\\]+)", 1, FolderPath)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, ExtensionId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

KQL Detection – Extension-Originated Suspicious Network Connections

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe")
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("pastebin", "discord", ".onion", "ipfs", "anonfiles", "telegram")  // Suspicious exfil paths
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "--extension" or RemotePort in (443, 80)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ReportId

KQL Detection – Extension Installation with Unusual Permissions (From WEF or DeviceRegistryEvents)

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey has "Extensions"
| where RegistryValueName in~ ("permissions", "host_permissions")
| where RegistryValueData has_any ("tabs", "webRequest", "<all_urls>", "cookies", "storage", "webRequestBlocking")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName

KQL Detection – Browser Developer Mode Enabled


This rule looks for browsers launched with flags commonly associated with Developer Mode, such as --load-extension, --disable-extensions-file-access-check, or --disable-extensions-http-throttling.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("--load-extension", "--disable-extensions-file-access-check", "--disable-extensions-http-throttling")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
  • --load-extension: Allows manual loading of unpacked extensions—often used for testing or unsigned extensions.

  • --disable-extensions-file-access-check: Disables certain security checks, opening paths for abuse.

  • --disable-extensions-http-throttling: Often used in conjunction with dev/test extensions to reduce delays, can indicate tampering.




ThreatIntelIndicators

| where TimeGenerated > ago(365d)

| where now() between (ValidFrom .. ValidUntil)

| where isnotempty(Data.labels)

| mv-expand Data.labels

| where Data_labels has "mitre"

| extend MitreID = parse_json(tostring(Data_labels)).Alias

| where MitreID == "T1555.003" // Credentials from Web Browsers

| summarize IOCcount=count() by ObservableKey, Confidence

| sort by IOCcount desc





















confused copilot


References


Lurking Threats in Post-Authentication Sessions


Mitre ATT&CK: Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers


Mitre ATT&CK: Steal Web Session Cookie


Hands in the Cookie Jar: Dumping Cookies with Chromium’s Remote Debugger Port


Atomic red team: T1539 - Steal Web Session Cookie


Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie


List of Chromium Command Line Switches


Debugging Cookie Dumping Failures with Chromium’s Remote Debugger


Remotely debugging Firefox instances


Pivot to the Clouds: Cookie Theft in 2024


Detecting browser data theft using Windows Event Logs


Device Bound Session Credentials explainer


Behind the Chrome Vault: A Guide to Stealing Cookies


Behind the Chromium Vault: A Guide to Stealing Cookies II


Go BLUE! A Protection Plan for Credentials in Chromium-based Browsers


Cookie-Bite: How Your Digital Crumbs Let Threat Actors Bypass MFA and Maintain Access to Cloud Environments


Cookie stealing: the new perimeter bypass


Hunting Raccoon: The New Masked Bandit on the Block


Big-Game Stealing (Part 2): Defenses for Top Infostealer Techniques


Detection.fyi: Potential Cookies Theft via Browser Debugging


Hijacked Extensions: The Threat of Compromised Browser Add-Ons


Abusing DPAPI


How Infostealers Are Bypassing New Chrome Security Feature to Steal User Session Cookies


Stealers evolve to bypass Google Chrome’s new app-bound encryption


Katz and Mouse Game: MaaS Infostealers Adapt to Patched Chrome Defenses


Demystifying Myth Stealer: A Rust Based InfoStealer


BitM Up! Session Stealing in Seconds Using the Browser-in-the-Middle Technique


The Ultimate Guide to Session Hijacking aka Cookie Hijacking


Rethinking Remote Browser Isolation (RBI)


Island Introduces the World’s First Self-Protecting Browser


Origin trial: Device Bound Session Credentials in Chrome


Infostealers Crash Course: A Tradecraft Tuesday Recap


Huntress 2025 Cyber Threat Report: Proliferating RATs, Evolving Ransomware, and Other Findings


A Detailed Guide to Chrome Remote Debugging


Browser Stored Credentials


Web Browser Stored Credentials


Abusing DPAPI

 
 
 

Recent Posts

See All
Key Cybersecurity Metric Concepts

The Importance, and Challenge of Cybersecurity Metrics Metrics are foundational to driving and refining business processes, and...

 
 
 

Comments


Post: Blog2_Post
  • Facebook
  • Twitter
  • LinkedIn

©2021 by croninity. Proudly created with Wix.com

bottom of page